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Abstract: Cultural appropriation is often defined as the ‘taking of intellectual property, 
cultural expressions or artifacts, history, and ways of knowledge.’ Despite this apparent 
link to intellectual property, legal issues are only rarely mentioned in the current debate. 
Thus, to start with, this article aims to fill this gap in identifying the possible bases in 
existing laws that may, at least in principle, justify claims of unlawful behaviour. As far 
as ethical considerations are concerned, the article then notes a deep divide between 
those who fully endorse the notion of cultural appropriation and those who are reso-
lutely opposed to it. This article aims to give fair consideration to both sides of the argu-
ment, suggesting three categories of potentially unethical conduct. On this basis, the 
article finally revisits possible legal responses from a normative perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘cultural appropriation’ was rarely used prior to the early 2010s; yet, this has 
changed in recent years, with a Google search showing 2.9 million results in 2019.1 This 
trend does not mean that the concept of cultural appropriation is uncontroversial. Ra-
ther the opposite: the debate is deeply divided between those who fully endorse it as a 
welcome protection of group identities and those who are resolutely opposed to it em-
phasising the benefits of cultural borrowing and mixing.2 
To illustrate the debate, this introduction provides a representative list of recent exam-
ples. These examples are phrased in a relatively general manner; yet, this article will 
then also discuss how far variations in the precise context could make a difference. The 
examples are: 
 
(1) Is it acceptable to wear a haircut that derives from another culture (e.g., ‘white 
people with dreadlocks’3)? 
(2) Is it acceptable to wear items of clothing that derive from another culture (e.g., 
sombreros at an English university freshers’ fair4)? 
(3) Is it acceptable to identify as belonging to another culture (e.g., Rachel Dolezal 
identifying as black5)? 
(4) Is it acceptable to run a business pretending to belong to another culture (e.g., 
Indian restaurants run by people from other countries6)? 
(5) Is it acceptable to perform an artistic role that represents someone from another 
culture (e.g., a straight actor in a transgender role7)? 
(6) Is it acceptable to pursue a hobby that derives from another culture (e.g., yoga 
in Western countries8)? 
(7) Is it acceptable to produce works of art that take the perspective of another cul-
ture (e.g., the film ‘Isle of Dogs’ set in Japan9)? 
                                                     
1 Google search. Available at: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%22cul-
tural%20appropriation%22 and https://www.google.com/search?source=hp&ei=d3-rW-un-
HKaZgAao_4zADQ&q=‘cultural+appropriation’. All internet sources were accessed on 24 November 
2019. 
2 See further Sections 3.1 and 4.2, below.  
3 ‘Dear White People with Dreadlocks: Some Things to Consider’, CNN, 1 April 2016. Available at: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/living/white-dreadlocks-cultural-appropriation-feat/index.html.  
4 ‘Student Union Bans “Racist’ Sombreros”, The Guardian, 29 September 2015. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/uea-student-union-bans-racist-sombreros. 
5 ‘Rachel Dolezal Is Back, Refusing to Apologize for Lying About Being Black’, Vanity Fair, 28 February 
2017. Available at: https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2017/02/rachel-dolezal-refuses-to-apologize.  
6 ‘White People Running Indian Restaurant???’, The Student Room, 5 March 2016. Available at: 
https://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/showthread.php?t=3932243.  
7 ‘Is Hollywood Guilty of Cultural Appropriation in its Casting?’, Acculturated, 27 May 2017, https://ac-
culturated.com/hollywood-guilty-cultural-appropriation-casting/. 
8 ‘Is My Yoga Cultural Appropriation? What to Do About It’, Huffington Post, 2 September 2016. Availa-
ble at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/susanna-barkataki/is-my-yoga-cultural-ap-
pro_b_9191342.html.  
9 ‘”Isle of Dogs” Is a White Man’s Fantasy of Japan’, Vice, 10 April 2018. Available at: 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/paxqkn/isle-of-dogs-is-a-white-mans-fantasy-of-japan.  
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(8) Is it acceptable to produce works of art that take inspiration by works of art from 
other cultures (e.g., merge pop art with Japanese ukiyo-e10)? 
(9) Is it acceptable to produce commercial products that are influenced by products 
from other cultures (e.g., Jamie Oliver’s jerk rice11)? 
(10) Is it acceptable to use icons from other cultures as brand names (e.g., name and 
logo of the Washington Redskins12)? 
 
It can be seen that possible cases of cultural appropriation comprise of a variety of situ-
ations and phenomena: some are about changing one’s looks, others about behaving in 
a particular way, and others about creating something tangible. They also concern a va-
riety of cultural categories, including some, such as gender and sexual orientation, 
where it may be a matter of debate whether those really belong to the field of ‘cul-
ture’.13 There also some ambiguities in the understanding of the word ‘appropriation’, 
as will be shown later in the text (Section 3.2, below). Thus, as we will see, there are 
different kinds of cultural appropriation which may also elicit different responses. 
This article will discuss both the law and the ethics of cultural appropriation. It aims to 
give fair consideration to both supporters and critics of cultural appropriation. As legal 
issues are only rarely mentioned in the current debate, it is a further contribution of this 
article to explain that, at least in some respects, law may play a role. Considering the 
legal debate can also be helpful for heuristic reasons: while it is clear that ethical con-
siderations can be different from legal ones, the legal debate is valuable in showing that 
often a balance between different interests needs to be struck.  
The corresponding structure of this article is as follows: Section 2 explains the possible 
bases in existing laws that may justify claims of unlawful behaviour. Section 3 develops 
a framework for ethical considerations. Section 4 then revisits possible legal responses 
from a normative perspective. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Law: Existing Bases for Unlawfulness 
Susan Scafidi book ‘Who Owns Culture?’, which predates the current debate, defines 
cultural appropriation as the ‘taking (…) of intellectual property, cultural expressions or 
artifacts, history, and ways of knowledge’ (Scafidi, 2005, p. 9).14 Despite this apparent 
link to intellectual property, legal issues are only rarely mentioned in the current debate. 
Thus, this section aims to fill this gap in identifying the possible bases of existing laws – 
be it intellectual property or other areas of law, such as tort law. Subsequently, this ar-
ticle will also discuss how far further legal topics – notably artistic freedom and freedom 
                                                     
10 Art of the Game: Ukiyo-e Heroes 2017, see https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5706420/.  
11 ‘Jamie Oliver’s “Jerk Rice” Accused of Cultural Appropriation’, BBC News, 21 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-45246009.  
12 ‘Washington Redskins / Is it Cultural Appropriation?’, Posilicious, 25 September 2017. Available at: 
http://posilicious.com/2017/09/25/washington-redskins-is-it-cultural-appropriation/.  
13 Cf. Quora discussion, Available at: https://www.quora.com/Does-the-concept-of-cultural-appropria-
tion-also-apply-to-gender. 
14 See also Scafidi, 2005, p. 13: ‘Among the forms of property, intellectual property provides the best 
analogy to cultural products’; and at ix referring to ‘cultural products’ such as ‘cuisine, dress, music, 
dance, folklore, handicrafts, images, healing arts, rituals, performances, natural resources, or language’). 
  4  
 
of speech – may stand against any extension of such laws constricting cultural appropri-
ation (see Sections 3.3 and 4, below). 
2.1 Copyright and specific laws protecting traditional knowledge 
As copyright does not require registration, it may already cover some circumstances of 
cultural appropriation; yet, there are a number of limitations that make it unsuitable for 
some of the examples discussed here, with details also depending on the precise rules 
which a country provides: 
As far as the object of copyright is concerned, not every aspect of a culture is protected. 
Common requirements are that there is a ‘work’ (i.e. not simply an idea but an expres-
sion of an idea), which in some countries also requires a fixation in a tangible medium, 
as well as a degree of originality (or creativity) (e.g., Scafidi, 2015, pp. 21, 31, 42; Scafidi, 
2001; for a comparative overview of the fixation requirement: Carpenter and Hetcher, 
2014). Showing originality of a particular cultural phenomenon can be practically diffi-
cult as cultures have mixed and as the origins of particular traditions are often not clear 
(e.g., who did first create the sombrero, yoga, jerk dishes etc.?). As copyright protection 
is also limited in time (details differ between countries),15 protection of possible cases 
of cultural appropriation is more likely to be successful if it concerns a fairly recent and 
more specific variation of a cultural phenomenon (e.g., a particular type of dress or rec-
ipe; for the latter see e.g. Germain, 2019). 
The work requirement and, if necessary, the fixation one are clearly fulfilled in the cases 
that concern the creation of something tangible (see the final four examples, Section 1 
above). In some of the other cases it is possible to gain copyright protection by way of 
audio-video recording or photographs, for example, taking a photograph of a particular 
haircut or recording a form of dance, song, speech pattern etc (e.g., Pavis, 2018, p. 871). 
Moreover, most copyright laws provide ‘related rights’ (also known as ‘neighbouring 
rights’) which protect the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and 
broadcasting organisations of copyrighted work.16  
With respect to the prerequisite of there being a copyright holder, it can be a problem 
that the phenomena of possible cultural appropriation are typically created by groups. 
In principle, copyright can belong to more than one person and it has even been said 
that ‘copyright law has been remarkably flexible in defining “authorship’’’, for example, 
for the contributions of employees within a company (Jaszi, 2017). However, it is also 
clear that phenomena associated with some large groups (e.g., having a particular race, 
gender or sexual orientation) cannot be protected by copyright. 
Thus, the issue at stake is that group members and their contributions need to be iden-
tifiable (e.g., Li, 2014, pp. 35-60; Riley, 2000). As with the requirement of ‘originality’, 
copyright protection is therefore more likely to be available if a specific variant of a wider 
                                                     
15 Article 7 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September 
1886 stipulates a minimum of 50 years. 
16 E.g. in the EU, see Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intel-
lectual property. 
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cultural phenomenon is created by a sub-group of persons from the source commu-
nity.17 Thus, for example, there is no means to prevent Western film-makers making a 
film set in Japan;18 yet, if they copy particular story-lines from protected Japanese works, 
violation of copyright is conceivable. 
Copyright protection means that the copyright holders have exclusive rights to repro-
duce, distribute and adapt their work. This would not help in some of the possible cases 
of cultural appropriation (e.g., where a person of ‘the wrong’ group wears a particular 
piece of clothing). However, many countries also extend copyright protection to ‘moral 
rights’, in particular the rights of attribution and integrity of a work (Inawat, 2015, p. 240 
with reference to the Berne Convention). Thus, for example, a distortion of a cultural 
phenomenon – as alleged in some cases of cultural appropriation – is unlawful assuming 
the object falls under the protection of copyright.  
In some countries, in particular in Africa, further extensions of copyright protection may 
also be relevant. For example, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, and 
Uganda include ‘folklore’ as a, possibly intangible, form of copyright that derives from 
particular communities, even if the author is unidentified. Further details differ between 
countries, possibly also with some involvement of the state (e.g., a National Folklore 
Office in Ghana) (Inawat, 2015, pp. 238-40; Collins, 2018).  
Moreover, in some countries, special laws grant a sui generis protection for ‘traditional 
knowledge’, ‘traditional cultural expressions’ and/or ‘indigenous knowledge’, for exam-
ple, in Thailand, the Philippines, Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru and 
South Africa (Fisher, 2018, pp. 1537-8; Carugno, 2018, p. 270).19 Details vary with some 
of these laws also going beyond issues of intellectual property law, for example as they 
address questions of human rights (see also Riley and Carpenter, 2016, p. 894). The 
wider trend, exemplified in these laws, can also be seen in a number of international 
model laws, recommendations and conventions of the United Nations and two of its 
specialised agencies (UNESCO and WIPO): the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples contains some general provisions about the protection of cultural tradi-
tions and traditional knowledge;20 the documents by UNESCO deal with expressions of 
folklore, traditional culture and intangible cultural heritage;21 and WIPO currently devel-
ops an international legal instrument on traditional knowledge and cultural expression, 
dealing with their control, attribution and remuneration (if exploited by others).22 
                                                     
17 The other side of the coin is that others can use copyright to take unprotected cultural products from 
a source community, see Sharoni, 2017, p. 416. 
18 See the example (7) in Section 1, above. 
19 The most one is the South African law, namely the Act No. 6 of 2019: Protection, Promotion, Develop-
ment and Management of Indigenous Knowledge Act, 2019.  
20 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the General As-
sembly on 31 September 2007, Articles 11 and 31. 
21 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploita-
tion and Other Prejudicial Actions (1982); Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore (1989); Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003). 
22 Draft Articles on the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions (2011, as amended). For further 
discussion see, e.g., Robinson et al., 2017; Pager, 2016. 
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Considering the impact of these new forms of protection on cultural appropriation, on 
the one hand, these rules may be seen as extensive as they address the limitations of 
tangibility and group rights in copyright law. On the other hand, the protection of tradi-
tional or indigenous knowledge and culture means that they do not cover broader cul-
tural groupings related to, for example, religions, nationalities, and gender. As these 
emerging international rules are not yet globally accepted, it is also clear that they do 
not solve all possible cases of cross-border cultural appropriation. 
2.2 Trademarks, geographical indications and other laws 
In some of the initial scenarios, it is conceivable that the potential victims of cultural 
appropriation can register their interests as trademarks, patents or design rights. The 
use of trademarks shall be the main focus of this sub-section. 
Some of the frequent requirements of a trademark, for example that it needs to be dis-
tinctive and that it has visual perceptibility (Scafidi, 2005, pp. 31, 42), exclude fairly gen-
eral and intangible cultural phenomena. As countries either require registration or give 
preference for registered trademarks (for an overview see Aylen, 2018), it also follows 
that a person or group needs to make a deliberate decision to apply for trademark pro-
tection for specific goods and goods services. In return, and different from copyright, as 
long as holders use the trademark, its protection does not have a time limitation. 
Trademark protection may address some of the possible cases of cultural appropriation. 
For example, in the US, ‘source communities’ are said to ‘be able to register their names, 
certain phrases, symbols, designs, artwork, certain music, and characters in oral tradi-
tion’ (Sharoni, 2017, p. 426). The Navajo tribe, for example, holds eighty-six registered 
trademarks under the name ‘Navajo’; yet, recent judicial disputes also illustrate the lim-
itations of such trademarks. When a manufacturer of clothes, Urban Outfitters, used the 
Navajo name, the tribe challenged; Urban Outfitters then stopped producing these 
clothes – however, a claim for compensation against Urban Outfitters remained unsuc-
cessful because Navajo did not hold a trademark that would cover the specific items of 
clothing (see Moynihan, 2018; Riley and Carpenter, 2016, p. 903). 
The reverse situation has also been the subject of recent discussions, namely the pro-
tection of indigenous groups against trademarks (or patents) of companies. For exam-
ple, in the US, a court cancelled the Washington Redskins trademark as disparaging to 
Native Americans (Phillips, 2017); in South Africa, a court rejected the application of a 
German company for a patent that would make use of indigenous bio-resources (Msomi, 
2015); and in New Zealand, the law explicitly forbids registration of trademarks which 
contain, or are derived from, a Māori sign including text or imagery, assigning this as-
sessment to a Māori Trade Marks Advisory Committee.23 
As far as cultural products refer to specific geographical locations or origins, protection 
can also be provided by rules on geographical indications. In particular, this is the case 
                                                     
23 See New Zealand Intellectual Property Office, Available at: https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/trade-
marks/practice-guidelines/current/examination-of-trade-mark-applications/; this has become relevant 
recently, see ‘Māori anger as Air New Zealand seeks to trademark “Kia Ora” logo’, The Guardian, 12 Sep-
tember 2019. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/12/maori-anger-as-air-new-
zealand-seeks-to-trademark-kia-ora-logo. 
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in countries where such protection benefits everyone who produces a product in a par-
ticular region (e.g. this is the rule in the EU24). Frequent examples are the names for 
certain food and drink (Champagne, Parmesan etc.), assuming that a particular name 
has not become a generic one (‘French fries’ etc.).25 With respect to the case of Jamie 
Oliver’s jerk rice (noted in Section 1, above), Jamaica already protects the term ‘Jamaica 
jerk’ and it aims to extend this protection to other countries;26 yet, it seems unlikely that 
such international rules may be forthcoming. 
Finally, some more general laws can be relevant, in particular for cases which involve 
forms of deception or defamation. In many countries, there are specific laws protecting 
consumers against unfair commercial practices27 which may apply to cases where some-
one deceives the public about their true identity. For example, it is said that the respec-
tive Australian law can apply ‘if a person selling artwork and representing that it is true 
indigenous artwork when it is not’ (Kariyawasam, 2012). However, other cases are un-
likely to be unlawful under any law, such as ‘merely’ running a Indian restaurant (while 
not being Indian) or writing a book under a pseudonym (and therefore possibly associ-
ating with another group identity).28 
Tort law can potentially be relevant in some cases. General statements are difficult to 
make since tort law varies considerably between countries. Some forms of derogatory 
cultural mixing may reach the threshold of a tort of defamation (or equivalent concepts) 
if they undermine the reputation of individuals;29 yet, this does not cover mere cases of 
‘making fun’ of another culture. While it has also been suggested that, in common law 
countries, the protection of intangible cultural resources may be achieved through the 
notion of ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress’ (Carr, 2013), here too these are 
likely to be rare cases as it is bound to be difficult to proof intention (and it would also 
require ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct – a standard unlikely to be reached in ethi-
cally ambiguous cases, as discussed in the next part). 
2.3 Preliminary conclusion 
It follows that in some of the representative examples of cultural appropriation (as listed 
in Section 1, above) it is possible there may be a violation of the law. Notably, this is the 
case for the final three examples if a cultural product is specific enough to be protected 
by means of copyright (possibly in example 8), geographic indications (possibly in exam-
ple 9) or trademark (possibly in example 10). In the examples that concern changing 
one’s looks or behaving in a particular way, constructing an infringement of copyright is 
                                                     
24 Council Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications 
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. See also Dagne, 2015. 
25 In addition, some rules distinguish between different products, see e.g. the higher protection for 
wines and spirits in Articles 22-24 of the TRIPS Agreement (1994). 
26 ‘Jamaica Seeks International Legal Protection for “Jamaica Jerk”’, RJR News, 21 August 2018. Available 
at: http://rjrnewsonline.com/local/jamaica-seeks-international-legal-protection-for-jamaica-jerk.  
27 E.g. in the EU: Directive 2005/29/EC of concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices 
in the internal market; for Australia see the following sentences of this paragraph. 
28 See example (4) in Section 1, above. 
29 For a comparison of common law jurisdictions see Kenyon, 2006; for European countries see Brügge-
meier et al., 2010. 
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difficult (e.g., examples 1 or 2); in some cases, unfair competition law or tort law may be 
relevant in extreme circumstances (e.g., possibly in examples 2 or 4). 
This incomplete legal protection is intentional because the relevant laws are based on 
specific rationales. For example, the classic rationale for protecting intellectual property 
is that it incentivises their creation and prevents free-riding (e.g., Burk, 2012); yet, such 
protection has its limitations (note the restrictions of time, scope etc.) because too-ex-
tensive protection would deter innovation and restrict the availability of ideas and goods 
available to the public, in particular as far as such protection would monopolise them 
(as often noted by critics of IP law, e.g., Boldrin and Levine, 2010). Similarly, tort law 
starts with need for protection – here that it aims to induce potential tortfeasors to in-
ternalise the potential damages they may inflict on others – but also acknowledges that 
its protection should not go too far in restricting everything that may potentially impact 
on someone else (e.g., because excessive precautionary actions would diminish overall 
utility; see generally Faure, 2009). 
This section has referred to some country variations in the relevant laws. It also men-
tioned that in some countries, recent law reforms have introduced protection of tradi-
tional knowledge, which can potentially be relevant for cases of cultural appropriation. 
Further variations can be due to the way private and public institutions operate, for ex-
ample, whether publishers or universities act in a way to exclude any possibility of being 
accused of ‘cultural appropriation’. These latter cases, which are often contentious, will 
be discussed in the penultimate section of this article (Section 4.2, below) which will 
then also revisit the role of law from a more normative perspective.  
Before doing so, the next section will address the ethics of cultural appropriation. It will 
show that some links to the legal debate can be made – as indeed some scholars (e.g., 
Merges, 2011) emphasise the ethical foundations of intellectual property (and the rela-
tionship between law and ethics/morals is of course also a general theme of legal phi-
losophy). Yet, as will be discussed, it is also possible that certain actions are legal but 
potentially unethical. 
3. Ethics: Towards an Evaluative Framework 
There is some confusion about the precise scope and accusation of cultural appropria-
tion being ‘unethical’. The following starts with the possible view that all cases of cultural 
appropriation (in particular all of the examples mentioned in Section 1, above) would be 
seen as inappropriate. Subsequently, it discusses the view that cultural appropriation 
always has to be about power imbalances. Rejecting both of those positions, the final 
part of this section will suggest three categories of potentially unethical conduct. 
3.1 Is cultural appropriation always inappropriate? 
In social media (Twitter etc.) some proponents of a complete rejection of all forms of 
cultural appropriation merely make their case with a statement such as ‘This is cultural 
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appropriation: stop it’30. Thus, this seems to argue that there is some kind of general 
ethical norm according to which cultural appropriation is always inappropriate.  
However, considering only some examples, it can be seen that ethical evaluations of 
cultural appropriation differ considerably. For example, even prior to the current debate 
about cultural appropriation, some extreme cases (e.g. ‘blackfacing’ in the US) were 
widely dismissed as being inappropriate; yet, other cases show that there has not been 
a general rejection. For example, detective fiction often uses a first-person narrative, 
though the author is not actually a detective (and much the same applies in other artistic 
fields).31 
Thus, rather than simply stating it, the argument needs to be made that general ethical 
concepts support the new position of a complete rejection of any form of cultural ap-
propriation. The following will mainly distinguish between ethical positions that take a 
consequentialist or a deontological perspective; yet, other perspectives will also be ad-
dressed in the subsequent discussion.32  
From a consequentialist ethical perspective (e.g., Peterson, 2013), it may be argued that 
respecting the ‘ownership’ of cultural phenomena would be good for everyone: your 
own cultural ideas and products are protected and it is up to you to allow others to make 
use of it. However, a practical problem with such line of reasoning is that asking about 
consent to cultural appropriation is in many instances hardly feasible. As far as intellec-
tual property rights are possible (see the previous part), there are usually distinct groups 
who can provide such consent. Yet, in other examples, the groups in question are too 
large to have any reliable mechanism that would operationalise such a consent proce-
dure (e.g., if it is about a man writing from a female perspective, would we need to sur-
vey all women of the world?). 
Following a consequentialist position, it can also rather be the case that ‘appropriating’ 
the phenomena of another culture is beneficial for the greatest number of people.33 For 
example, it is possible that a different perspective provides new insights into the topic 
under discussion, as examples from the world of literature show (Smith, 2010, p. 348, 
noting that authors such as Ibsen, Shaw and Joyce were better understood abroad than 
at home). In other instance, the advantage is the spread of good cultural phenomena:34 
for example, if a particular culture does something that makes everyone who enjoys this 
phenomenon happy – be it a particular music, food, dress etc. –, it is beneficial for other 
                                                     
30 E.g. https://twitter.com/Soooraayaa/status/626127765532753920; https://nl.pinter-
est.com/pin/551761391825074048/. 
31 For this discussion see e.g. Lionel Shriver’s controversial speech at the Brisbane Writers Festival 2016. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/13/lionel-shrivers-full-speech-i-
hope-the-concept-of-cultural-appropriation-is-a-passing-fad; ‘The Painting that has Reopened Wounds 
of American Racism’, The Observer, 2 April 2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/apr/02/emmett-till-painting-reopened-america-wounds-race-exploitation-dana-schutz.  
32 See e.g. the contributions in Copp, 2006 as well as Section 3.2, below (referring to Rawls and Locke). 
33 Thus, this relates consequentialism to utilitarianism, see generally Driver, 2014.  
34 For a similar point see ‘Three Cheers for Cultural Appropriation’, New York Times, 30 August 2017. 
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/opinion/cultural-appropriation.html. 
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cultures that they can also benefit from it (and, as the same applies to the first culture, 
it can also benefit from cultural phenomena developed elsewhere). 
Furthermore, a general rejection of any form of cultural appropriation would be harmful 
for societies as it would make it more difficult to mix cultural phenomena. Cross-fertili-
sation of ideas is often emphasised as a general benefit of cultural mixing, in other 
words, ‘ideas needed to meet and mate’ in order to cumulate, meaning that it can lead 
to something which is greater than the sum of its part (Ridley, 2010, p. 6). For example, 
reference can be made to the popularity of fusion dishes, stories that mix cultural tradi-
tions, and physical products that are only possible if you allow the mixing of different 
tools.35 
From a deontological ethical perspective, it is also unconvincing to argue in favour of a 
general rejection of cultural appropriation. Taking Kant’s Categorical Imperative as 
standard, one of its formulations states that you are to ‘act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (Kant, 
1785/2003, p. 4:421). Thus, in the present case, it could be argued that humans suffer 
from being the victim of cultural appropriation and that they would therefore endorse 
a rule that would ban it completely. However, this assumed suffering is not self-evident. 
Sometimes cultural appropriation can be felt positively, namely as recognition of an-
other culture. Considering cultural appropriation as a cause for emotional harm is also 
problematic as it uses a circular logic: one’s own feelings towards a particular behaviour 
are often a reflection of whether this behaviour is endorsed in a particular society – in 
other words: if you clarify in advance that cultures are open and that cultural exchange 
and mixing is positive to your society,36 people are more likely to accept such mixed 
phenomena as common good. 
Another formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative is that you should ‘act in such a 
way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (Kant, 1785/2003, p. 4:429). Some 
suggest that this is indeed the case here since ‘[t]he telling part about cultural appropri-
ation is the lack of consideration of the context you are taking the cultural piece from, 
and not asking permission for using it in that way’ (Bar-Yam, 2016, p. 6; similar also Ken-
nedy and Laczniak, 2014). But, here too, this is not a matter of course: the motivation of 
cultural appropriation can also be an endorsement of this culture (e.g., its food, clothing, 
music etc. – or even its entire identity37); thus, again, details matter as the following sub-
sections will discuss. 
3.2 Is cultural appropriation only about power imbalances? 
Some supporters of the concept of cultural appropriation only apply it to a situation 
where there is a power imbalance between the possible victim and the perpetrator. For 
instance, taking the view that Western culture is more powerful, it is seen as acceptable 
                                                     
35 For the final point see Ridley, 2010, p. 7 (‘imagine if the man who invented the railway and the man 
who invented the locomotive could never meet or speak to each other’); for fusion dishes see also Sec-
tion 3.3, below. 
36 For a similar line of reasoning see ‘Is Cultural Appropriation Immoral (Deontology)?’, 8 July 2018. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P72Q7Srd6k8. 
37 See example (3) in Section 1, above. 
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that non-Westerners wear Western clothing (ties, suits etc.) but not that Westerners 
wear clothing from other cultures (e.g., see the case of the sombreros, mentioned in 
Section 1, above).38 Further examples may refer to other forms of power relationships. 
For example, writing under a pseudonym would be unacceptable if it concerns a ‘Yale-
educated white male’ choosing a Latino-sounding name,39 but acceptable if it concerns 
a female author choosing a male name.40 Or, for example, consider the situation in India 
where moustaches are seen as a symbol for the higher castes: thus, persons from lower 
castes wearing moustaches would be seen as acceptable even if the higher castes do 
not approve it.41 
This requirement of power imbalances could also be motivated by other instances in 
which such imbalances are said to be relevant. Some of the literature refers to the im-
pact of colonialism and the oppression of indigenous cultures as it relates to cultural 
appropriation, to efforts to return stolen property to former colonies, and, specifically, 
to the history of the legal dispossession of Indian property in the US (Kuprecht, 2014; 
Scafidi, 2008; Riley and Carpenter, 2016). In addition, it seems likely that the wider con-
text of this requirement may be influenced by Marxist (or neo-Marxist) and postmodern 
positions which often use the divide between the powerful (the oppressors) and the 
powerless (the oppressed) as one of their main analytical tools (cf. Lukianoff and Haidt, 
2018, pp. 53-78). 
It follows that, according to this view, it is clearly unacceptable if a powerful group fur-
ther advances its privileged position by way of taking cultural phenomena from less 
powerful groups. By contrast, in the reverse situation, the powerful group is not seen as 
having a right to complain about the use of its cultural phenomena: thus, here we have 
no case of ‘cultural appropriation’. Yet, in this reverse situation there can then also be 
the problem that the powerless group feels unduly compelled to assimilate to the cul-
tural norms of the powerful one (called ‘covering by Yoshino, 2006; e.g. note the discus-
sion about terms such as ‘Black Anglo-Saxons’ and ‘acting white’ in the US and ‘Castle 
Catholic’ and ‘West Brits’ in Ireland). 
Applying a requirement of power imbalances to cultural appropriation faces a number 
of practical problems. To start with, it requires a clear understanding about the relevant 
groups. For example, in the US, accusations of cultural appropriation due to persons 
having ‘the wrong’ haircut (e.g., dreadlocks) or wearing ‘the wrong’ clothes (e.g., wear-
ing a Chinese dress)42 are often merely based on the ethnicity of the person and thus 
                                                     
38 Quora discussion, Available at: https://www.quora.com/Why-is-wearing-Western-clothes-not-a-cul-
tural-appropriation-of-the-West.  
39 Cf. ‘OBITUARIES: Daniel James: Writer Who Masqueraded as a Latino’, L.A. Times, 21 May 1988. Avail-
able at: http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-21/news/mn-2879_1_daniel-james. 
40 Cf. https://robert-galbraith.com/about/. 
41 ‘India’s Lowest Caste Fights Discrimination with Mustache Selfies’, CNN, 6 October 2017. Available at: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/06/asia/india-dalit-discrimination-selfies/index.html. 
42 For the first example see Section 1, above; for the second one see ‘Girl Slammed on Twitter for Cultur-
ally Appropriating Her Prom Dress Says She Would Wear it Again’, Cosmopolitan, 2 May 2018. Available 
at: https://www.cosmopolitan.com/style-beauty/fashion/a20123163/keziah-daum-prom-dress-cultural-
appropriation-cheongsam-qipao/. Another example is: ‘K-pop's EXP Edition: The world’s most controver-
sial “Korean” band’, BBC News, 6 December 2018. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-46381997.  
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possibly unrelated to any actual cultural belonging. Moreover, there is a lack of clarity 
how power is defined: for example, can someone from Israel wear a Japanese dress43 or 
can someone from China identify as Finnish?44 And how do we deal with changes in the 
power relationship (e.g., considering the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, white farmers in 
Zimbabwe, Russian-speakers in Ukraine)? 
As far power imbalances are derived from historical developments, the problem also 
arises that questions about ‘the correct’ understanding of history become a relevant 
factor for current ethical rights and obligations. For example, considering the fierce dis-
agreements about the question ‘who was the original owner of a particular land?’ in 
Israel/Palestine, Serbia/Kosovo, Greece/(North-)Macedonia, Russia/Ukraine etc. show 
that ‘history’ is unlikely to provide a clear solution. It is also open to manipulation since 
it may not be the actual historical experience that matters to people but rather how it 
is used (or abused) by persons or groups who want to advance a particular opinion.45 
In substance, it is suggested that group-based assessments of power imbalances are at 
odds with notions of personal responsibility and fairness. In international law, no one 
‘may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed’.46 This prohi-
bition of collective punishment also reflects more general notions of fairness. For exam-
ple, a recent newspaper article calls different rules for different groups a ‘terrible idea’ 
going against any sense of fairness, reciprocity and justice given that ‘the people being 
targeted are different than the people who historically oppressed people of colour and 
women’.47 A speech by Barack Obama expresses a similar position, namely that one 
should not say that some persons ‘lack standing to speak on certain matters’ because of 
their group identities.48 From the perspectives of theories of justice, reference can also 
be made to John Rawls’ insight that people reach the most just solution on their society’s 
basic principles if they imagine themselves behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (i.e. not knowing 
which group of society they would belong to; for a discussion of the relationship be-
tween Rawls’ position and ‘identity politics’ see Chua, 2018, p. 179). And adopting the 
position of Locke that there is a natural right of ownership of one’s own labour49 also 
                                                     
43 ‘Eurovision: Israel Winner Netta Accused of Cultural Appropriation over Japanese Theme’, Independ-
ent, 13 May 2018. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/euro-
vision-winner-netta-israel-latest-cultural-appropriation-japan-costume-a8349296.html.  
44 ‘Why Do Millions of Chinese People Want to be “Spiritually Finnish”?’, The Guardian, 5 August 2018. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2018/aug/05/why-do-millions-of-chinese-
people-want-to-be-spiritually-finnish.  
45 Cf. Ochsner and Roesel, 2017 (study finding that the population of the Austrian municipalities affected 
by Turkish occupation 500 years ago have more hostile attitudes towards Muslim migration than other 
municipalities today; yet, this divergence only occurred since 2005 when the right-wing Freedom Party 
referred to the Turkish sieges in their political campaigns). 
46 Geneva Convention IV, Article 33; similar Geneva Convention III, Article 87.  
47 ‘Identity Politics Does Not Continue the Work of the Civil Rights Movements’, Areo, 25 September 
2018. Available at: https://areomagazine.com/2018/09/25/identity-politics-does-not-continue-the-
work-of-the-civil-rights-movements.  
48 Available at:http://time.com/5341180/barack-obama-south-africa-speech-transcript/.  
49 For an application of this reasoning to IP rights see Merges, 2011, pp. 31–67 (and at 108 how it may 
be linked to the position of Rawls). 
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has to lead to the conclusion that the mere belonging to a group cannot justify different 
treatment. 
The final reason – and the decisive one for the purposes of this article’s line of reasoning 
– is that it is linguistically impossible to make the meaning of the word ‘appropriation’ 
dependent on power imbalances. Considering the Latin origins of this word, it simply 
refers to the process of making something ‘one’s own’ (proprius). To draw an analogy to 
the word ‘theft’: we may say that we find it ethically less reprehensible when a poor 
person steals from a rich person, rather than vice versa; yet, it is clear that both situa-
tions refer to something called ‘theft’. Thus, in the cases discussed here, it is of course 
possible to say that abuse of a position of power as regards cultural phenomena is ethi-
cally wrong, but this should then be called something else (e.g. cultural ‘oppression’, 
‘domination’, ‘dependency’), while it is not plausible to make power imbalances a re-
quirement of the definition of cultural appropriation. 
3.3 Categories of potentially unethical conduct 
Starting with the aforementioned meaning of the term ‘cultural appropriation’, the fol-
lowing distinguishes between three forms of making another culture ‘one’s own’: (i) by 
denying the origins of a cultural phenomenon, (ii) by treating it disrespectfully and (iii) 
by diminishing its use in the source culture. It will however also be shown that often a 
balance between other interests needs to be struck. 
First, denying the origins of a cultural phenomenon can include some situations which 
are unlawful, for example, if there is lack of attribution in case of intellectual property 
protection or if deception can be classified as unfair commercial practice (see Sections 
2.1 and 2.2, above). Other situations may be lawful, but potentially unethical: for exam-
ple, some criticise the retail chain store ‘Miniso’ for using Japanese-style branding as an 
apparent quality signal, even though it is mainly a Chinese company.50 
Implicit situations are often difficult to assess. For example, do restaurants which offer 
a particular type of food need to disclose the nationality of their owners, chefs etc.? It is 
likely that differences in context often play a role: for instance, in many countries it may 
be common that Italian food is offered in any type of restaurant (and thus there is no 
implicit statement that its owners or chefs are Italian); and at least in the UK, it is also 
very common that Indian restaurants are actually run by people from other countries.51 
Other food-related topics are even more ambiguous. For example, Jamie Oliver, selling 
‘jerk rice’, was accused of culturally appropriating Jamaican food while also being ‘dis-
honest’ as authentic Jamaican jerk is about meat, not rice. Thus, it could be suggested 
that these altered origins should have been clarified on the package. However, it may 
also be said that the meaning of words can change: for example, it is culturally accepted 
that today’s ‘pizzas’ can be different from the original Neapolitan ones. It is also clear 
that many foods and dishes are mixtures which blend various influences whereby it may 
                                                     
50 ‘Is Miniso a Japan-Based Chain Store?’, Macau Daily Times, 26 January 2016. Available at: https://ma-
caudailytimes.com.mo/retail-is-miniso-a-japan-based-chain-store.html.  
51 Quora discussion, Available at: https://www.quora.com/Why-are-almost-all-Indian-restaurants-in-
the-UK-owned-by-Bangladeshis.  
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be unrealistic, or even impossible, to expect that each and every potential cultural influ-
ence is fully explained. 
This leads to the situations where there is no statement about a particular cultural origin 
at all. Here too, it may often not be realistic to expect that each and every cultural influ-
ence is disclosed; for example, in today’s world, we may wear pieces of clothing which 
originate from various other places, but there is no expectation that we hang a sign 
around our neck that says ‘I’m from x culture and I wear shoes from y culture, trousers 
from z culture etc.’ In other cases, there may be legitimate interests not to mention 
one’s group identity. For example, just because an actor plays a gay role (or indeed a 
straight one), does not lead to the obligation to disclose his or her sexual orientation. 
There can also be good reasons for authors to write anonymously, in particular where 
they want readers to engage with the substance of the text (as opposed to ad-hominen 
or group-related attacks52). 
Second, some cases of cultural appropriation through disrespectful treatment also reach 
the threshold of being unlawful (e.g., under tort law), though those are rare examples 
(see Section 2, above). More generally, it is clear that here too the particular context 
often plays a decisive role. At the basic level, for example, certain signs or words may be 
seen as deeply offensive in one culture but not in another one (e.g. consider the swastika 
sign or false friends in British/American English). For some of the examples mentioned 
in Section 1, we also need to consider the context: for instance, is it about wearing a 
sombrero on a sunny day at the beach or at a party that intentionally makes fun of Mex-
ican traditions?53 And are particular names or signs that derive from indigenous cultures 
displayed and used in a way that is offensive or complimentary?54 
In this category of potential cultural disrespect, it is particularly important to balance 
between this consideration with other interests such as artistic freedom and freedom 
of speech. There is no general ethical obligation only to write about topics related to 
one’s own group identity or life experience (see also Section 3.1, above). For example, 
artists may deal with other cultures in a respectful way and make special efforts to do 
so.55 However, artistic freedom also includes the right to mock cultural practices.56 
Moreover, the argument of cultural appropriation should not be used so as to exclude 
persons from other cultures from talking or writing about certain topics, even if it is done 
                                                     
52 Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar point: ‘Go Ahead, Speak for Yourself – Not every opinion 
needs to be underwritten by your race or gender or other social identity’, New York Times, 10 August 
2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/sunday/speak-for-yourself.html.  
53 See also ‘The Question of Cultural Appropriation’, Current Affairs, 6 September 2017. Available at: 
https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/the-question-of-cultural-appropriation (‘Is the originating 
group and its culture being celebrated, appreciated, and respected, or are they being degraded, mocked 
and accessorized?’). 
54 For this example see ‘Is Cultural Appropriation Immoral (Deontology)?’, 8 July 2018. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P72Q7Srd6k8.  
55 Note the emerging practice of ‘sensitivity reading’, cf. ‘What the Job of a Sensitivity Reader Is Really 
Like’, Vulture, 5 January 2018. Available at: http://www.vulture.com/2018/01/sensitivity-readers-what-
the-job-is-really-like.html. 
56 E.g. see ‘Weird Al’ Yankovic’s Amish Paradise. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOfZLb33uCg. 
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in a way that is sceptical about a particular cultural phenomenon (e.g., criticising FGM57); 
thus, here the apt response should be to argue about the substance of the topic, rather 
than using the concept of ‘cultural appropriation’ as an ad hominem to silence the de-
bate.58 
Furthermore, in this category, we can include cases where the relevance of power im-
balances plays a role. For example, making fun about a powerful group (e.g., a governing 
party, a dominant religious group) is more likely to be justified where this is one of the 
few means of the weaker group to challenge the former’s influence and criticise certain 
practices (e.g., use satire in the wake of scandals in the Catholic church59). It may also 
take the legitimate form of ‘subversive appropriation’ in the international sphere, for 
example, where foreign ideas are used as a means of resistance against dominant pow-
ers (Merry, 1998, pp. 585-6). 
Third, cultural appropriation can be about conduct which diminishes (or even make dis-
appear) the use of a cultural phenomenon in the source culture. Here too, this is 
straight-forward as far as this phenomenon enjoys the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights (e.g., where a particular product or sign is protected by copyright or trade-
mark law, see Section 2, above). Other cases could also be contemplated: for example, 
if Jamie Oliver’s jerk rice becomes more popular than authentic Jamaican dishes, is this 
then inappropriate?60 And is this also the case where an actor plays a role of someone 
of another group and, doing so, takes away the job opportunities of actors of this 
group?61 
To start with, it needs to be considered that such cases may also promote the cultural 
phenomenon in question. In other words, one should not simply assume that its use 
‘crowds out’ the opportunities of the source culture, but that it can also result in a 
‘crowding in’ effect. This line of reasoning can be particularly relevant where the popu-
larity of a cultural phenomenon is fading. For example, in a programme about the Japa-
nese woodcut art technique of ukiyo-e it is said that a declining number of Japanese 
artists apply it and that, according to a Japanese commentator, it is appreciated that a 
Canadian craftsman and an American designer merge it with forms of pop-art.62 
Recognising the change of cultural phenomena is also relevant in some situations. For 
example, in the UK, chicken tikka masala is now seen as a ‘British national dish’, notably 
due to the way it has adjusted the original Indian dish to the needs of the local market.63 
                                                     
57 A main reference point of the debate is the chapter ‘Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Muti-
lation’ by Nussbaum 1999, pp. 118-29. 
58 See also the quote by Obama in Section 3.2, above. 
59 This has been a recent topic in Germany: ‘Titanic vs Papst Benedit XVI: Was darf Satire?’, JE, 11 July 
2012. Available at http://www.juraexamen.info/titanic-vs-papst-benedikt-xvi-was-darf-satire/.  
60 See also BBC Africa Debate ‘Can You Trademark Culture?’, 1 October 2017. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3cstwlp (‘misappropriation’ as a form of appropriation). 
61 See ‘The Issue with Able-Bodied Actors Taking Roles with Disabilities’, The Student Newspaper, 12 Sep-
tember 2018. Available at: http://www.studentnewspaper.org/the-issue-with-able-bodied-actors-tak-
ing-roles-with-disabilities/. 
62 See example (8) in Section 1, above. 
63 As famously noted by the UK foreign secretary Robin Cook in 2001, see ‘Robin Cook’s chicken tikka 
masala speech’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/19/race.britishidentity. 
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In the US, the history of jazz music may be seen as an example of its cultural appropria-
tion by white composers (Paul Whiteman in particular); yet, as it has evolved, it has also 
gained appeal to the wider public as ‘America’s classical music’.64 
Finally, here too, we have to balance the interests in question. For example, the argu-
ment that actors of certain groups should not play certain roles goes against principles 
of artistic freedom and it may well be left to the audience to decide whether they mind 
watching, say, a play with a straight actor in a transgender role. With respect to the cases 
of economic competition (regarding dishes, music or other products), it can is also be 
argued that it may be best to let consumers decide which product they prefer. However, 
this can be different where power imbalances distort the level playing field: for example, 
if a restaurant chain purchases the building next to an ethnic family restaurant and 
opens a restaurant which copies the latter’s menu, it may well be seen as unethical (or 
indeed it may constitute a violation of unfair competition law, see Section 2.2, above). 
To conclude, the differentiated position developed in this section accepts only some 
cases of cultural appropriation. It is therefore suggested that the term ‘cultural appro-
priation’ is an example of a ‘concept creep’ – akin, and possibly related, to the critical 
finding by Haslam that negative concepts in psychology such as abuse, bullying and prej-
udice ‘have expanded their meanings so that they now encompass a much broader 
range of phenomena than before’ (Haslam, 2016). 
4. Law (Again): Possible Legal Responses 
The previous sections have shown that proponents of the concept of cultural appropri-
ation suggest a fairly large number of cases, but that only some of these cases may under 
some circumstances be unlawful and that some further cases may be unethical. On this 
basis, this section addresses possible legal responses, aiming at rules that either prevent 
cultural appropriation to a larger degree or – if one takes a more sceptical view – prevent 
the overreach of cultural appropriation in the social sphere.  
This topic also includes arguments against the use of law. Legal theorists frequently dis-
cuss the possible limits of law: in Europe and North America, works on law’s legitimate 
scope often start with Mill’s ‘harm principle’ and then discuss how far legal intervention 
may also be justified on other grounds (overview in Stanton-Ife, 2006; using Kantian ar-
guments Ripstein, 2009). It can also be seen as a typical ‘Western’ position that morality 
and law are treated as substitutes: thus, if there are strong moral norms, it is argued 
that the repressive force of law is not needed (e.g. Osiel, 2019). By contrast, non-West-
ern legal traditions, notably religious laws, often have less hesitation to extend their 
reach to all areas of life (for an overview of legal traditions see Glenn, 2014). Conse-
quently, there cannot be any global consensus how far legal rules should address the 
topic of cultural appropriation. Still, it is possible to identify the following normative 
considerations (based on a general ‘Western’ perspective) 
                                                     
64 For the conflicting positions see, e.g., ‘Black Rhythm, White Power’, The Morningside Review, 
2007/08. Available at: https://morningsidereview.org/essay/black-rhythm-white-power/.  
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4.1 More rules preventing cultural appropriation? 
The three categories of potentially unethical conduct identified in the previous Section 
(Section 3.3, above) referred to some situations where existing laws already cover such 
cases of cultural appropriation. The question raised here is therefore whether the law 
should go further: so as far as cultural appropriation is unethical, should more situations 
be treated as unlawful? 
Some legal scholars advocate that intellectual property law should broaden its scope. 
Susan Scafidi explicitly proposes new rules that protect cultural products of source com-
munities, such as community-generated art forms (Scafidi, 2005, p. xi). More specifically, 
others also suggest extensions of particular types of intellectual property, for example, 
granting greater copyright protection to indigenous communities (Carpenter 2004; 
Merges 2011, p. 267) and broadening the scope of performer’s rights (Pavis, 2018). How-
ever, it is also accepted that intellectual property protection should not be limitless. Ac-
cording to Scafidi, intellectual property should not be ‘expanded to a degree that threat-
ens to impoverish the public domain and strangle creative enterprise’, as can also be 
seen in its temporal limitations as compared to rights to real and personal property (Sca-
fidi, 2005, pp. xi, 17). Similarly, the prior review of the existing laws concluded that too-
extensive legal protection can have a negative effect (Section 2.3, above). Thus, any ex-
tension of intellectual property law should only be contemplated in a modest way, for 
example, reflecting trends to provide greater protection for traditional knowledge (Sec-
tion 2.1, above), with further details dependent on the specific context of the country 
and culture in question (similar Fisher, 2018). 
Extending the legal protection against cultural appropriation can also be challenged for 
other reasons. To start with, it may cause problems of legal certainty: it is often practi-
cally difficult to establish who created a particular cultural phenomenon and how it may 
have become mixed with other phenomena (see Section 3.1, above); in the words of 
Sally Merry, ‘culture as contested, historically changing, and subject to redefinition in 
multiple and overlapping field’ (Merry, 1998, p. 602). Moreover, if one considers possi-
ble acts of cultural appropriation beyond intellectual property law, it is bound to be even 
more difficult to define the boundaries of unlawful conduct. 
Further objections concern the need to consider other interests, which also means that 
it would be difficult to develop workable general legal rules. As we have already seen 
for the categories of potentially unethical conduct (Section 3.3, above), it is often nec-
essary to balance any legitimate claims of cultural appropriation with considerations 
such as artistic freedom and freedom of speech. Finally, cultural phenomena need space 
to flourish: thus, it is also suggested that further legalisation and marketisation of cul-
ture would not be in their best interest. 
4.2 More rules preventing overreach of cultural appropriation? 
The analysis of potentially unethical conduct in Section 3 referred to situations where 
some allege cultural appropriation but where there are better reasons to argue that the 
conduct is ethically acceptable. So should law have something to say about such misled 
claims made by supporters of cultural appropriation? 
The main reason this could be contemplated is that unjustified but successful accusa-
tions of ‘cultural appropriation’ may be harmful in demanding ‘pure cultures’. Thus, such 
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a position could discourage cultural borrowing and mixing, disregarding the evidence 
that such forms of hybridisation have been essential to much of human progress (see 
Section 3.1, above). Reference can also be made to the wider debate about ‘identity 
politics’ (e.g., Appiah, 2018; Fukuyama, 2018; Lilla, 2017). Here recent publications often 
criticise how the group-based identity politics of both the far-right and the far-left dis-
regard both human commonalities and individual responsibilities. For example, it is 
stated that human commonalities are beneficial in their emphasis on openness, diversity 
and competition of ideas, while an emphasis on group identities leads to localism, ex-
clusiveness and ideological cleansing; and that once one ‘ceases to see people as indi-
viduals, and rather sees them as symbols of a class, violence usually follows’ (e.g. refer-
ring to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Idi Amin’s Uganda).65 
Considering possible legal responses, some circumstances are clearly outside any spe-
cific legal rules: for example, it is entirely up to the host of a Halloween party whether 
to invite persons who like to dress in a way the host may or may not regard as cases of 
cultural appropriation. By contrast, in other circumstances, legal rules (including con-
tracts) can be means to prevent the overreach of cultural appropriation. Some of those 
legal rules may be of a specific nature. For example, considering the situation of a pub-
lisher cancelling a contract ‘for good cause’ with an author because he/she wrote from 
the perspective of another culture,66 contractual interpretation may lead to the rejec-
tion of such a ‘good cause’. Other examples may concern the ongoing debate how uni-
versities deal with group identities (e.g. Kronman, 2019; Lukianoff and Haidt, 2018): 
here, for instance, as far as speakers are wrongly accused of cultural appropriation, rules 
that promote viewpoint diversity within universities may come into play.67 
Vis-à-vis more general laws, anti-discrimination laws can potentially be relevant. These 
laws are usually phrased in a way that, in certain fields, discrimination based on sex, age, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, disability and so on is prohibited.68 Thus, an example may be 
a job advertisement which limits the position to a certain group of persons, wrongly 
justifying this restriction with the risk of cultural appropriation: for instance, this has 
found to be the case for a restaurant from a particular culture refusing to hire people 
from other cultures.69 
                                                     
65 The online magazine Quillette focusses on these issues, see e.g. Sami J. Karam, ‘Purity or Universal-
ism?’, Quillette, 27 September 2018. Available at: https://quillette.com/2018/09/27/purity-or-universal-
ism/; Neema Parvini, ‘Individuals and Symbols’, Quillette, 18 October 2018. Available at: https://quil-
lette.com/2018/10/18/individuals-and-symbols/. For criticism see e.g. ‘Free Thought for the Closed-
Minded’, Slate, 8 January 2019. Available at: https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/quillette-claire-leh-
mann-intellectual-dark-web.html.  
66 Kenan Malik argues in a similar way: ‘In Defense of Cultural Appropriation’, New York Times, 14 June 
2017. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/opinion/in-defense-of-cultural-appropria-
tion.html.  
67 A recent example are the ‘Chicago principles’ and their endorsement by the Heterodox Academy. 
Available at: https://heterodoxacademy.org/hxa-awards-chicago/. For a critical discussion of the princi-
ples: Lee 2018. 
68 For a comparison of some of the differences see, e.g., Suk, 2012; Suk, 2007.  
69 ‘Restaurant fined $4,000 for Refusing to Hire a Waiter Because he Wasn’t Asian’, New Food Economy, 
22 February 2018. Available at: https://newfoodeconomy.org/ichiba-ramen-justice-department-na-
tional-origin-discrimination/. 
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Finally, here too, free speech law is another general area which is frequently mentioned 
in the debate between supporters and opponents of identity politics. For example, this 
issue often emerges in a situation where defenders of group identities, including those 
who take a wide notion of cultural appropriation, accuse persons with a more universal-
ist or individualist perspective of disrespect towards their group identity to which the 
universalists/individualists respond that free speech gives them the right to disregard 
the group identity focus of the formers.70 The best response is here that both sides can 
use freedom of speech (and other rights) to defend their position. As in the previous 
sub-section, it is therefore suggested that law should leave the outcome of such a disa-
greement about culture and identity politics to the non-legal sphere. 
5. Conclusion 
The topic of ‘cultural appropriation’ has been frequently discussed in recent years. Yet, 
this is the first article that aims to analyse it from a law and ethics perspective. It aimed 
to give fair consideration to both sides of the argument. Thus, on the one hand, it has 
rejected the view that ‘there is no such thing’ as cultural appropriation.71 This rejection 
should be a matter of course since, objectively, there are some laws which address some 
variants of cultural appropriation. In addition, some of the cases where ethical consid-
erations speak against cultural appropriation should also be fairly uncontentious, for ex-
ample, where it involves deceit. 
On the other hand, it is also suggested that some of the supporters of the concept of 
cultural appropriation overstate their case. For example, merely using a foreign cultural 
phenomenon (e.g., practicing yoga) is unlikely to raise any legal and ethical concerns, 
and imposing a general restriction to any cultural borrowing and mixing should also be 
rejected. Thus, instead of a general ‘ban’, this article suggests that potentially unethical 
conduct needs to (i) deny the origins of a cultural phenomenon, (ii) treat it disrespect-
fully or (iii) diminish its use in the source culture, all of which then also needs to be bal-
anced with other interests. 
Overall, this article has avoided taking an absolutist position as regards cultural appro-
priation. This does not advocate relativism but asks for a balanced approach. It is also 
suggested that law’s role should be limited, leaving space for the role of ethical consid-
erations. Finally, it is clear that, while this article has discussed cultural appropriation at 
a general level, in practice the local context often plays a decisive role – and, thus, the 
debate is bound to continue. 
  
                                                     
70 Searching Google News leads to more than 20,000 hits, http://news.google.com/search?q=‘iden-
tity+politics’+’free+speech‘. 
71 E.g. Reddit discussion, Available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/unpopularopinion/com-
ments/81gjlk/there_is_no_such_thing_as_cultural_appropriation/. 
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